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THE DEATH PENALTY: A DIALOGUE ON
MORALITY AND THE LAW: REMARKS BY
STEVE KAPLAN
BY STEVE KAPLAN1
First of all, thank you very much to the Law School and Bridget for inviting
me here. I’m not much of a mathematician, but if my arithmetic’s right I
think this is the fourth time I’ve been here speaking about capital
punishment. Professor Shea2 has had me over here a few times in the dead
of winter and, as compensation for that, he flew me down to Tucson one
February to talk about capital punishment to the students down there, so I
think we are even.
I want to congratulate the Law School and all of you for your interest in
capital punishment even though it’s not an issue that we deal with as
Minnesotans very often at the state level. As Jeanne3 was mentioning, we
don’t have it at all. We haven’t had it since 1911.4 At the federal level, we
have only had it in connection with the Dru Sjodin case, which some of you
may remember involved the abduction and murder of a University of North
Dakota student who lived in Minnesota and was transported across
interstate lines, and for that reason the federal government went after the
murderer for capital punishment.5 He is on death row as we speak.
Even though it may or may not be part of our everyday practice here or
consciousness as Minnesotans or Minnesota lawyers, the reason we focus
1
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on this is because it forces us to think about what is just. What do we hold
dear? What stage of development are we at as a people? What do we expect
of ourselves? Not the least of it, and you will appreciate this as a Catholic
institution in the same way I value it as a practicing Jew, is it forces us to
look at our religious principles we value and what we have come to learn is
worth doing and not worth doing. For all those reasons, we are drawn to it.
As Professor Stinneford just mentioned, we are dealing with just a nanopiece, a just tiny fraction, of the total population in our nation’s prisons. We
are talking today about roughly 2,850 people on death row nationwide, of
whom about one-fourth are in California.6 Most of them will die from
natural causes because it takes so long to grind through the state and federal
court system.7
As Mark8 indicated, for about thirty years, I was happily practicing as a
civil litigator. Most of it was tax related. I’ve been at the DOJ Tax Division
for five very happy years learning the nuances of federal court litigation and
enough tax law to do my own tax return – barely. When I came out here in
1980, I graduated into civil, business and tax litigation. If you got into
trouble with the IRS or the controller of the currency or the SEC, I was your
guy. If you needed somebody who knew about forensic pathology, blood
spatter, crime scene reconstruction, police interrogation techniques,
polygraphs, or capital jurisprudence, I was not your guy. But in 2001, I was
walking down the hall at Fredrickson, my law firm, and was accosted by a
fellow colleague of mine who was working on the Damon Thibodeaux
death penalty case.9 He asked me if I would mind working on it. Would I be
willing to join the team that had just taken on the case? I said to him,
“Dean, I’m happy to do that as long as I don’t become the lead lawyer on
it.” I walked back to my office, sat down, and wondered what I’d gotten
myself into. Three months later, I was the lead lawyer on it, at least at
Fredrickson & Byron. You know how that goes. It was, in retrospect, one of
the most rewarding experiences of my life. I would not change it for
anything. I have worked on death penalty cases that are still in progress. I
had a client executed two weeks ago. I’ve seen the gambit of the system. I
want to talk to you about things that I learned as a newcomer to the system
– things I observed over the last eighteen years of working on death penalty
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cases – and get you to understand why, putting aside the morality of it or
the penological justifications for it, it is a broken system, many of us have
come to conclude, as did the late Justice Blackman, that no matter how
much we tinker with the machinery of death, we can’t fix what is broken.10
I want to try, in the time that I have, to speak to you about some of the
things that I have found not only disturbing, but worth talking about to keep
people who do not practice or do not necessarily understand the innerworkings of how we go from the investigation through the capital
sentencing of capital defendants.
The issue of “cruel and unusual” gets boiled down in recent Supreme Court
rulings. Not so much to the method by which we kill people, but to whether
the system is constitutional or not. To my surprise, and here’s surprise
number one that I had as a newbie to this, the focus has been on whether the
system is arbitrary in its application or not. I remember, in 1972, sitting at
my desk and reading in the newspaper – because that’s where we got the
news back then – that the Supreme Court had voided the death penalty in a
case called Furman v. Georgia.11 Then I remember sitting at my desk four
years later when I was reading the newspaper and learning that the capital
punishment was back in practice. I thought that was rather head snapping,
but I didn’t understand or take the time then to figure out what had gone on.
As I started working on the Damon Thibodeaux case, Damen was, at the
time at 2001, about twenty-five years old.12 He had been on death row at
lovely Angola Prison in Louisiana for about three and a half years.13 He got
there because he had confessed to raping and murdering his fourteen-yearold cousin. So, I started doing what lawyers do, particularly tax lawyers
who don’t know a damn thing about capital punishment. I started reading
the jurisprudence, and I learned what had caused the Supreme Court, in
1972, to void capital punishment was that they declared it was arbitrary
and, because it was arbitrary, it violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
provision of the Eighth Amendment.14
What concerned them was that we were only, as a nation, executing about
fifty people a year and the sheer minimal nature of how many people were
being executed suggested to the Court that maybe it is too arbitrary.15 How
did these fifty, out of the total universe of people who committed a firstdegree murder, end up being dead and the rest of the thousands stay alive?
When the Court looked at the underlying statutes (in this case, the
prototypical statute was out of Georgia), they said, “You know, there are no
10
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standards. There are no safeguards as to who is going to be executed and
who isn’t.” So, they declared it arbitrary. In the words of one justice,
freakish in its application. The states that wanted capital punishment had to
go back to the drawing board, and they had to revamp the system. What
they did was they created the following, and I’ll just give the very basics of
it.
We will now have a two-part system. We will have a guilt and innocence
phase, which will be a conventional trial before a jury. Then if the jury
convicts, we are going to go to a sentencing phase or penalty phase. If it
convicts and we have this sentencing hearing, we will determine whether
there are statutorily enunciated aggravating factors. For example, was the
victim a law enforcement officer performing his or her duties? Was the
victim a child? Was the murder conducted in a particularly heinous
manner? Did the defendant have a previous history of violence? Those
would be the aggravating factors that the jury would have to make a finding
about. There could not be a death sentence unless there was an aggravating
factor found by the jury. On the other hand, there were also mitigating
factors. What was a mitigating factor? It was basically anything that would
convince even one juror out of the twelve that this defendant,
notwithstanding the horrible thing that he had just done, still merited life. In
the so-called mitigation or penalty phase, we would now hear from family
members, neighbors, psychologists, teachers, psychiatrists, counselors,
correctional officers – the whole gambit – that would try to explain how did
this fellow get from birth to where he is today. Is there any explanation for
it? Was he abused as a child? Was he addicted to drugs? Anything that
might suggest that it was in essence beyond his control what he did?
So, we were off. The Supreme Court said that was good enough. We have a
system now with sufficient standards. The governors, if all hell breaks loose
and the system yields the wrong result, well, they can always grant
clemency. There is no reason to think governors won’t do that, so they
approved the capital punishment system in 1976. So, we were off with what
we now call the modern death penalty system. The question that opponents
of capital punishment –and there are four of them on the Supreme Court
today – raise is, after some forty-two years of this modern death penalty
system experiment that we have been on as a nation, whether in fact we
have cured the arbitrariness and freakishness problem. That was one of the
things I learned right away: we were not dealing with the morality of the
death penalty. We were just dealing with kind of the administration of it
and whether it was being done in a way we could say was fair.
When I got into the Damon Thibodeaux case and started reading the trial
transcript, the first thing that I came upon, of course, was the voir dire – the
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jury selection process.16 That, quite honestly, threw me for a loop. Because
instead of talking to jurors about whether they could be fair and impartial
and could assume that the defendant was presumed to be innocent – and the
burden of proof was on the prosecutor – the standard stuff of criminal case
voir dire, it was whether you as a prospective juror could impose the death
penalty if the fellow sitting over there is convicted. If we prove that he
committed the murder and that he did it in an aggravated way, can you vote
to send that young man to the death house? So, we are not talking about the
presumption of innocence, we are presuming now that he is guilty and the
question is “What will you do about it?” Now the government, the
prosecution, has the right to what is called the “death-qualified jury.” That
means that a juror has to be willing to tolerate the notion of imposing the
death sentence on the defendant if that person is convicted and if the
aggravating factors are found and no mitigating factors are found.17
We now go to voir dire where it’s something like the following. Let’s
assume I am called for jury service. I’m in the pool and prosecutor has me
and he says, “Mr. Kaplan, what are you views about capital punishment,
and if we prove that Mr. Jones over here committed this murder and did it
in the way we said he did, can you vote for death?” I say in response to the
prosecutor, “You know, that would be a really, really difficult thing for me
to do. My religious, my moral, my cultural views would make it really hard,
and you know what? I don’t know what the evidence would be to make me
change my mind, but it would be extremely, extremely difficult.” Well, I
will be tossed off the jury for cause. The prosecution will not need to use a
preemptory challenge to get rid of me. I am gone because of my various
views. If I were in Louisiana, if I were a practicing Catholic, and I said it
violates my religious beliefs, I am gone. I’m off the jury. I will not be
allowed to sit.
Now suppose in voir dire I’m asked, “Mr. Kaplan, would you be able to
impose the death sentence on Mr. Jones if we convict him of all the things
we say he did?” I say to the prosecutor, “You know, yeah. I would be able
to do that. I believe if somebody takes a life, they should pay with their own
life. Yeah, I can vote for death.” The prosecutor now says to me, because he
does not want me stricken for cause, “Well, Mr. Kaplan, before you did
that, would you listen to the evidence and would you listen to the judge’s
instructions at the end of the case, and would you be able to apply the law
to the facts?” “Oh, absolutely.” So, the prosecutor has now saved me from
being stricken for cause. The defense lawyer for Mr. Jones is now in the
position of having to decide, “Do I spend one of my precious preemptory
16
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challenges getting rid of Kaplan, or are there worse jurors sitting out there
that I need to save them for?” The defense lawyer must swallow hard in
accepting me as a juror, even though he or she knows that I am going to be
a pro-prosecution judge or juror.
Playing through this process, as I read the voir dire in Damon Thibodeaux’s
case, it was clear to me that the jurors that were selected to hear his case
were not only tolerating of the death penalty but were also probably proprosecution with respect to Damon’s guilt of the crime. This means that in
phase one they were going to be pro-prosecution and, phase two, they were
going to definitely be pro-prosecution. The first thing that struck me was,
wow, this is different and the jury is going to be tilted in favor of the State
of Louisiana in this case, even before we get to the evidence. Due to the
nature of the case (that this is a death penalty case), the jury, not the judge,
will determine whether there are aggravating or mitigating factors. Unlike
any other criminal case, the jury does the sentencing. The Supreme Court,
in the case called Ring v. Arizona a few years ago, made it clear that any
findings of fact relevant to whether a defendant gets the death penalty or a
life in prison sentence has to be found by the jury.18 We put jurors into the
position of being the judge of who lives and who dies, which then raised the
next question in my mind. What is it about jurors, people drawn from the
voting rolls in their community, that enables them to have the life
experience, the intelligence, and the judgment to determine whether I
should live or I should die if I’m the defendant? Why do we assume that the
courtroom is the place to make this decision? What is it that imbues the
average citizen with this kind of judgment, with this ability to make that
judgment?
The next question that came to me is, what set of instructions can a judge
give to jurors that is going to help them make that determination? The judge
is going to read from the statute in the sentencing phase of the case.19 He or
she is going to read off the list of aggravating factors, they are going to read
of the list of mitigating factors, and then twelve jurors are going to retire
into the jury room and make some judgment about whether this guy should
live or die.20 Again, what equips them to do it? It then dawned on me that
this is not really a legal question at all; it is a moral question whether
somebody deserves to die. It is well and good to list the aggravating factors
and the mitigating factors, but it still comes down to what the jury thinks

18

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
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should be done to this person.21 Is there anything salvageable about them?
Is there anything in their lives where they were a victim of other people
who did them wrong?22 Is there some explanation that we can accept that
will cause us to grant this person a life sentence, rather than a death
sentence?23 We use the courtroom and the judicial process to make a
judgment that I don’t think is necessarily legal at its core. It is really, as I
said, moral, cultural, and religious. If I gave you the facts of one hundred
different cases where defendants were tried for capital murder, and I said to
you, “I want you to put in one pile the cases where the defendant convicted
was given a life sentence, and I want you to put in the other pile, where the
defendant was given a death sentence, you would only be guessing. You
would be guessing because you would be applying your own judgment,
your own sense of moral, religious, and cultural values rather than those
values of the twelve people who were called to hear the particular facts of a
particular case with a particular defendant in a particular community much
different than your own. We are talking mainly in the Deep South, where I
can tell you from my travels is a different world. Wonderfully nice people
who think completely differently than most of us here in Minneapolis-St.
Paul, my native New England, or in wherever you folks are from. It came to
me that if we are worried about arbitrariness, what can be more arbitrary
than the process I have just described?
Now the only factor that, if you were placing bets, would guide you as to
whether a person got a death sentence or a life sentence is the one that I
think Jeanne24 alluded to in her remarks, and that is the race of the victim. If
the victim is Caucasian, there is a many times greater chance, irrespective
of the race of the perpetrator, that the jury will give a death sentence.25 If
the victim is white rather than black or brown, there is a greater incidence
that a death sentence will be imposed.26 That’s a matter of statistics.27 You
can go on the Death Penalty Information Center website and they will tell
you in Louisiana, it is a ninety-seven percent greater chance of the death
sentence being imposed if the victim is white than if the victim was a
person of color.28 In California, it’s three times more.29 The State of
21
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Washington Supreme Court, just a couple weeks ago, voided its death
penalty system on the grounds that it is not only arbitrary, but racially
discriminatory.30 Of course, it won’t surprise you to learn that African
Americans form a disproportionate number of people on death row.31
Additionally, it won't surprise you to learn that African Americans form a
disproportionate number of people on death row, in terms of what is the
total percentage of black people on death row versus what is the total
population of African Americans in this country.32 There is this racial
component that won't go away.
The next thing that caught my attention was the disparity of resources
between the state that was doing the prosecuting and the defendant that was
being defended. It occurred to me, as I was getting into this, that the state
had all the time and money in the world if it wanted badly enough to
impose the death penalty in a particular case.33 The defendant on the other
hand, according to an ABA study on the subject, found that 99.7% of those
accused of capital murder are indigent and cannot afford a lawyer.34 The
question then becomes one of money and resources. Does that skew the
outcome of the capital punishment system? The answer that I concluded
was yes, it would have to – it couldn't not affect it.
First and foremost, the defendant has a Constitutional right under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the effective assistance of counsel.35 So, the
question is, “If you can't afford your own lawyer, where does your lawyer
come from?” As I learned, the lawyer comes from one of three places.
Either a public defender and, depending on where the public defender's
office is, they may or may not have enough people, enough money in their
budget, or enough skilled people to take on the task of a capital murder case
– because I can tell you from my experience it takes more time than you

Victim is White, Death Penalty information Center, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/studies-louisianaodds-death-sentence-97-higher-if-victim-white (last visited Jan 7 2019).
29
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30
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31
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32
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can possibly imagine. 36 I worked on Damon's case for twelve years. I spent
somewhere between 4,500 and 6,000 hours on this case and I was only one
of the lawyers.37 I worked with the Capital Post-Conviction Project of
Louisiana, the Innocence Project of New York, and the incomparable Barry
Scheck for ten years of the twelve that I worked on the case. The Capital
Post-Conviction Project, to give you an example of what I am talking about,
is tasked by state law with representing every death row inmate in the State
of Louisiana.38 There are about ninety to ninety-five of them at any
moment.39 There are between four and six lawyers at the Capital PostConviction Project of Louisiana.40 Can they represent all of these people in
post-conviction? No, because in post-conviction it is even more
complicated and more fact-intensive than it was before the trial.41 Because
now we have had the trial, so we have not only all the investigative work
that was done before the trial, we have now all of the work that was done at
the trial like exhibits and trial transcripts. As post-conviction counsel, we
are tasked with conducting our own investigation to determine whether the
individual was given an effective lawyer.42 Were there violations of due
process? We can talk about some of those in a minute.
The task of representing somebody in post-conviction capital defense work
is daunting. The question is, “Well, who's going to do it?” Because after
you are convicted and once you are on death row, you do not have a
Constitutional right to a lawyer.43 Louisiana says, and rightly so, “Well, if
we are going to kill people, we better give him a lawyer in postconviction.”44 The Capital Post-Conviction Project of Louisiana and others
like it, which are parts of the public defender offices in those jurisdictions,
are tasked with representing people that exceed their ability to represent.45

36

Counsel and Witnesses in Capital Cases, 18. U.S.C.A. § 3005 (1982).
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40
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There is just too many of them, too complicated, too time consuming, and
too expensive. So, what do they do?
They look for private lawyers from places like Minneapolis, Washington
D.C., Philadelphia, up and down the east coast, in the Midwest, Denver, on
the West Coast, L.A., and San Francisco to come in and do the work that
local lawyers in the jurisdictions where we are talking about – Louisiana,
Texas, the Death Belt states – where those lawyers are not willing or unable
financially to do the work.46 It falls mostly to larger law firms that have the
money to spend in this effort.47 My law firm has represented now four or
five people on death row in Louisiana plus the fellow I represented in South
Dakota.48 We are being asked to take on other cases in Louisiana, because
they know that we are committed to doing the work as well as we can and
we have got the money. We have enough paying clients to foot the bill to
let us spend money on people like Damon’s case.49
So, if you are looking for a public defender, you may get a wonderfully
talented committed lawyer but one who still cannot do the work. The judge
may get even with some private lawyer in the community and appoint him
or her to represent the indigent capital defendant.50 For that task the lawyer
gets to spend, in theory, a hell of a lot of time for, let's say, twenty percent
of what the average billing rate would be if they were working on a paying
client matter.51 Additionally, they are being asked to do it in a community
that is hostile to the defendant and presumably the majority of people are in
favor of capital punishment and want to see this person executed.52 That is
option two, a privately appointed, judge appointed lawyer, who wants to be
anywhere but in that courtroom.53 The third thing, and I've seen this, is the
family scrapes up a small amount of money – ten, twenty or thirty thousand
dollars – to do what would cost a half a million or more to do the right way.
The lawyer willing to take it, sees the retainer and does the work that the
retainer warrants, and then often stops working once they burn through the
retainer. When you read the transcripts in those cases, you are left to
46

Supra note 33.
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48
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49
See Client Successes, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., https://www.fredlaw.com/client_successes/
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50
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51
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52
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53
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wonder – not wonder, you know that the defendant was not afforded the
effective assistance of counsel. When we show up in post-conviction, we
see this.
The Supreme Court said in its landmark case, Strickland v. Washington, a
1984 death case that an “effective” lawyer meant one who investigated
every actual or potentially relevant fact before they formed the defense
strategy and presented it ably.54 That was the good news of Strickland.55
The bad news of Strickland is it is full of soft language that says, “Well, but
in judging what the lawyer did, whether they were effective, whether they
did something, did everything they should, we can't judge them too harshly
because we can't look at it in the light of after-the-fact hindsight. We have
to live in their shoes and understand why they decided to pursue this avenue
or this issue or this theory and not some other.” When you come in at postconviction and you show all of the evidence that the trial attorneys did not
present – because they did not investigate issues that they ought to have –
state court judges looking to salvage the conviction will say, “Well, it was
reasonable not to do that or it was a strategic decision not to pursue a
certain line and strategic decisions are O.K.”56 Whatever Strickland gives to
the defense, it takes away in some of the softer, squishier language.57 The
Supreme Court, having written Strickland in 1984, set off a wave of
ineffective assistance of counsel cases in the death penalty setting where
post-conviction lawyers, like me, would come in and argue that the defense
counsel was inept and deficient, and not only was it deficient but it had a
reasonable probability of affecting either the guilty verdict or the death
sentence that was imposed by the jury.58 The Supreme Court has used
ineffective assistance of counsel in the last twenty-five years or so as the
major means for overturning death penalty convictions.59
The problem then is – well all right, we have looked at ineffective
assistance of counsel – the other major ground for overturning a conviction
is the denial of due process. For due process we are looking mainly at the
manner in which the law enforcement and the prosecution conducted the
trial. We are looking to see: Did the police detectives, who testified,
perjure themselves? Did they coerce perjured testimony from other
witnesses? Did the prosecution offer, under the guise of scientific evidence,
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what is really junk science? Was evidence concealed? Was it tampered
with? Was it altered? In essence, was the defendant denied the right to a fair
trial? So, that is the other issue that now confronts you in post-conviction.
Now the problem is that when you present all of this new evidence, and let's
say that there were Brady violations – the police concealed evidence, like
they did in the case of John Thompson in Louisiana, where he came within
five weeks of being executed when it was found that the prosecutor in that
case had hidden a blood test that was exculpatory.60 The question is, we
have got ineffective assistance of counsel, we have got due process
violations, and now we are going to go back into court in what is called
“post-conviction” or “habeas proceedings.” We are going to likely show up
in front of the same judge that just tried the case at the trial. We are going to
be dealing with the prosecutor that prosecuted the case, the detectives who
got the conviction. We are going to be dealing, now, with the victim's
family. We are going to be dealing with public outrage that these guys from
Minneapolis are down here saying that this guy, who we all know is guilty,
is really innocent or doesn't deserve the death penalty, etcetera. So, we are
now not only confronted with what the legal burden is – to show a violation
of one or more constitutional rights that prejudiced the defendant – but we
are doing it in the context that is not pure. It’s not a laboratory; it’s not a
classroom. We are down in the belly of the beast, dealing with the people
who convicted this guy to begin with. Without going into chapter and verse,
you are not dealing with people who are open to the notion that they either
perpetrated, participated in, or presided over a gross miscarriage of justice.
So, there is that issue.
I want to talk, in the few minutes I have got left, about another legal issue
that bothered me to no end once I became aware of it. That is, the 1996
passage of the so-called Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 – AEDPA for short.61 It was in response to really two events I think:
the first bombing of the World Trade Center in the early ‘90s and then, as
Jeanne alluded to, the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building.
What Congress did there was basically do what it could to keep federal
courts from reversing state court decisions, convictions – particularly in
death penalty cases.62 The ripple effect of AEDPA is that it applies to
almost any felony case.63 What ADEPA did was it said the following: you
must bring your federal habeas petition, in which you were attacking the
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state court conviction, within a certain period of time. Then, even if you do
it on time, the federal court cannot reverse a state court conviction unless
the opinion flies in the face of established Supreme Court law – not lower
federal courts, but U.S. Supreme Court law on point – or it is an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent or the Supreme Court
has announced a new Constitutional right that is retroactive and applicable
to your case.64 The federal courts now, even if they review a case and
conclude that it was wrong – that the State Supreme Court of Louisiana or
Texas or Alabama got it wrong – nonetheless, they didn't get it
unreasonably wrong. Now wrap your head around that, it is wrong but not
unreasonably wrong. What the heck matter does it make whether it is
unreasonable or just wrong? It is wrong, but the federal courts were told to
stay the heck out of state court convictions. Why? Because federal habeas
relief, at that time, for death row inmates basically allowed defense lawyers
to come in multiple times and seek relief on a variety of grounds. It was
taking too damn long to kill people, Congress said. In the wake of the
political fallout from the Oklahoma City bombing, this is what we got. With
this, the federal courts are largely removed from state court conviction
review.
If you have watched Making a Murderer65 – and close your ears if you don't
want me spoiling this for you or if you have not otherwise followed the case
– Brendan Dassey confessed.66 This is a fellow with about a sixty IQ.67 He
was convicted on that. It went up to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals; they
affirmed it. The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to hear it. The Federal
District Court in Milwaukee said the confession was involuntary and threw
it out, and the conviction got tossed out with it. The state of Wisconsin
appealed it to a panel of the Seventh Circuit, which voted two to one to
affirm the judge’s finding in the District Court that it was involuntary and
should be tossed. Then it went up en banc to the entire court in Chicago, the
whole Seventh Circuit, which voted to reverse the panel's decision. It was
not done so much, I don't believe, on the merits of whether Brendan Dassey
was coerced; it was whether the state courts had been unreasonable in
concluding he had not been.
This is why people get upset with lawyers and judges – because we are
focused on an issue, not whether what he said was reliable or not. Not even
whether it was voluntary or not, but whether the state court – the Court of
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Appeals of Wisconsin, the last one that ruled on the merits – if they got it
wrong and if it was unreasonably wrong. If there is any logic to that, you
can explain it to me because I do not see it.
The last thing that I will talk about and that really jolted me was visiting
Damon and then, later, others on death row. Over the course of my work
with Damon, he and I talked probably once or twice a week from about
2005 until he was exonerated and released back into the real world in late
September of 2012. Then I visited him on various times down on death row
in Louisiana. What struck me was how anybody could survive in solitary
confinement for a week, let alone fifteen years, for a crime you did not do.
Then I learned, well, everybody on death row in Louisiana and in most
other states is sent to solitary confinement, just as a matter of course. Not
because they are necessarily in need of being restricted in that manner, but
because the presumptions are that they are violent, they are desperate, and
we are going to confine them.
For twenty-three hours a day, death row inmates are kept in solitary.
Damon had an eight-by-ten cell. He was allowed out one hour a day. On
three of the seven days in the week, he could go out into what I would call a
dog run – an enclosed fenced area where he could run. He could use his
hour to call me or to do other things. When I would listen to him on the
phone, I could hear shrieking of other men down the concourse that he was
on. The lights never go off at night. There is no air conditioning – in the
summer in Louisiana, imagine that. The guys stripped down naked and lay
on the concrete to try to ameliorate the heat.68 The food is dreadful. The
healthcare is next to non-existent, and so, diabetes and heart disease are
rampant on death row.69 If you were not crazy when you got there, you will
become next to crazy in a relatively short time. So, the conditions on death
row create in many people what is known as “death row syndrome.” That
is, a number of people will volunteer to be executed rather than continue the
legal fight for life because they can't bear to live another day on death
row.70 They would rather end it. In Damon's case, he not only wanted to
sign a waiver giving up his case even though he was innocent, he figured
that it was the only way he could control his own life. Because if he spent
another ten years fighting – and he had already lost in the justice system
because they sentenced him to death to begin with – spent ten years
fighting, living in in solitary, and then get the death penalty anyway, “Why
would I want to do that?” So, he actually had to be talked out of giving up
68
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by one of the lawyers down at the Capital Post-Conviction Project of
Louisiana. The rest of the world calls this torture. We have another name
for it, I don't know what we call it, but it is Constitutional; it is acceptable.
Once we finish up with the rest of the prepared remarks, I will be interested
to take any of the questions that you folks have.
Thank you again.

